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The present paper investigates the free-riding problem in determining product quality within 
cooperatives in a vertically related market. Whereas the individual member has to bear all 
costs associated with higher quality, the benefits of delivering higher quality have to be shared 
among all members. On the basis of a Mixed-Oligopoly model, we show that the free-rider 
problem in the supply of high-quality products, although important for the members of the 
cooperative, may not be strong enough to ensure that firms will always supply higher quality 
than cooperatives. Whether the cooperative can overcome the free-riding problem and supply 
a final product of high quality is shown to depend on the consumer’s valuation of quality, the 
costs of producing high quality, the way in which the quality of the final product is 
determined from the quality levels of the inputs delivered as well as on the number of 
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Do Cooperatives Offer High Quality Products? 
Vertical Product Differentiation in a Mixed Oligopoly 
 
1. Introduction 
Cooperatives and investor-owned firms are alternative forms of business organisation that 
coexist and compete in many markets. The theoretical literature has identified a number of 
comparative advantages and disadvantages of cooperatives (Fulton, 1995; Albaek and 
Schultz, 1998;  Karantininis and Zago, 2001; Bogetoft, 2005). A classical problem of 
traditional cooperatives is the quantity control problem, which arises from the decentralised 
decision making of the members of a cooperative (Phillips, 1953). Each member (farmer) 
decides how much to deliver to the cooperative and the cooperative thus has no control over 
what  is actually supplied to the market. Although an individual farmer realizes that an 
increase in production reduces the price in the final market, he does not internalize the profit 
loss stemming from the price decrease incurred by the other members of the c ooperative 
(free-riding).
1 
Decentralized decision making within a cooperative also leads to quality control problems, 
which could be considered even more detrimental to the prosperity of cooperatives since, in 
contrast to quantities, the quality delivered by individual members very often is difficult to 
observe and might be  non-contractible between independent actors. The problem  of  free-
riding on product quality with decentralized decision making is a well-recognized problem in 
the literature on cooperatives (see, among others, Cook 1995, Fulton 1995 and Winfree and 
McCluskey, 2005) and is nicely illustrated in Babcock and Weninger’s (2004) case study of 
                                                 
1   Albaek and Schultz (1998) investigate the consequences of this behaviour in a market, where the 
cooperative competes with an investor owned firm (mixed duopoly). The authors find that due to the 
decentralisation of output decisions, cooperatives tend to overproduce. Interestingly,  this negative 
externality turns out to be a comparative advantage of cooperatives in Cournot competition. 
Overproduction in the cooperative serves as a commitment device for credibly and profitably gaining 
market shares: ‘… the results of this paper suggest that in the long run all farmers would be members of 
the cooperative’ (Albaek and Schlutz, p. 401).   2 
the Alaskan Salmon Industry: “... suppose two fishermen deliver to a single processor. The 
fishermen know that part of the investment in quality that increases price will end up in the 
pocket of the other fisherman. The two fishermen get roughly a half-share of the benefit of 
quality-control efforts, yet both bear the full cost of those efforts” (p.14). Similar observations 
have been made for cooperatives in wine production in Germany (Frick, 2004; Dilger, 2005).  
The present paper investigates this free-riding problem in determining quantity and quality 
within cooperatives in a vertically related market. Upstream firms (farmers) deliver inputs to 
the downstream market, where the cooperative and an investor owned firm (mixed duopoly) 
use the components delivered to produce a composite good which is then sold to consumers. 
Whether the cooperative can overcome the free-riding problem and supply a final product of 
high quality is shown to depend on the consumer’s valuation of quality, the costs of producing 
high quality, the way in which the quality of the final product is determined from the quality 
levels of the inputs delivered as well as on the number of members of the cooperative.  
In the next section (section 2) we set up the model. Section 3 investigates the quality decision 
of the profit maximizing firm and the cooperative, when the number of members of the 
cooperatives and the number of primary producers delivering to the firm is exogenous 
(closed-membership). In section 4 the primary producers are allowed to choose between being 
a member of the cooperative and delivering to the firm (open-membership). Section  5 
concludes. 
 
2. The Model 
We follow Albaek and Schultz (1998) as well as Karantininis and Zago (2001) and consider a 
situation where there are two manufacturers and n farmers who sell through one or the other. 
We call one manufacturer the cooperative (C) and the other the investor owned firm, for short 
the firm (F). The cooperative and the firm compete in the market in a Cournot fashion. From 
the  n farmers,  nC deliver to the cooperative and  nF to the firm ( C F n n n + = ). The   3 
manufacturers use the components delivered from the farmers and produce a composite good 
which is then sold to consumers. Depending on the quality level of the components delivered, 
each manufacturer’s product is associated with a number  0 >
g s ,  } , { L H g ˛  which 
represents its quality level (with 
L H s s > ). To determine the quality of the final 
(manufacturer’s) product, three different cases can be distinguished: (a) one could follow 
Economides (1999) and assume that the quality of the manufacturers’ composite good is the 
minimum of the quality levels of its components (the inputs delivered by the individual 
farmers). (b) Alternatively, the quality of the final product  could be determined as the 
(weighted) average of the quality of inputs delivered by farmers. This might be plausible in 
the case of wine production for example, where the quality of the wine crucially depends on 
the quality of the grapes delivered.  And finally (c), one could take the other extreme and 
assume that the quality of the final product is determined by the highest quality of the inputs 
delivered. We consider the last assumption to be rather unrealistic and will not consider this 
case further here. In the following, we will first discuss the implications of assumption (a). 
The consequences when assuming (b) will be discussed later. 
We assume that manufacturers have constant marginal costs which are normalized to zero. 
Farmers, on the other hand, have positive production costs. Producing high quality inputs is 
assumed more costly then producing low quality inputs: 




) (  with
L H f f > . To 
simplify notation, we normalize  0 =
L f  and  0 ‡ = f f
H . For a given product quality, all 
farmers have the same production technology.
2  
Each farmer can choose between delivering to the cooperative or to the firm. If the farmer 
chooses to deliver to the cooperative, he has to decide whether to produce high or low quality 
                                                 
2   Note that different assumptions concerning the cost of quality have been made i n the literature on 
endogenous quality choice so far. Here, we do  not consider the cost of quality as a variable cost 
component. A detailed discussion on this issue is available in Hoffmann (2005). An interesting extension 
would also be to consider heterogenous farmers to investigate, which type of farmer delivers to the 
cooperative and the firm respectively. Karantinides and Zago (2001) investigate this issue in more detail.   4 
and what quantity (q) to produce and deliver. The cooperative uses the inputs received and 
produces the final good which is then sold to consumers. The cooperative thus operates with 
an ‘individualistic’ decision-making process, where each member decides how much and 
which quality to deliver, whereas the cooperative has no control over what is actually supplied 
to the market. The cooperative also retains no profit. The unit price paid to the farmer either is 
p
H, if the product is of higher quality than the competing firms’ product, or p
L, in the case 
where the cooperative offers the product with the lower quality. Depending on the prices 









The situation of farmers, who choose to deliver to the firm, is different. Following Albaek and 
Schultz (1998), we assume that the firm has a (perfect) contract with the farmers. Hence its 
behaviour can be described as if the firm maximises the vertically integrated profit of itself 
and its suppliers (farmers). In fact, the firm makes all the relevant decisions (how much to sell 
to the market and what level of quality to choose). As the distribution of profits is not 
essential here, we follow Albaek and Schultz (1998) in assuming that the vertically integrated 
profit is distributed among all farmers delivering to the firm.
3 Depending on whether the firm 





















= p . 
Finally, it remains to describe consumer behaviour. Consumers’ preferences are formalized in 
the spirit of Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) and Tirole (1988). There is a continuum of 
                                                 
3  An alternative would be to view the firm as acting in a Cournot duopsony. Given that farmers deliver to 
the firm are price takers, the firm will pay according to the farmers´ supply function (i.e. aggregate 
marginal costs). This assumes that the firm can write a perfect contract with its suppliers specifying 
quantity and quality of the product delivered. Although this version of the model would give very similar 
results we still prefer to consider the firm as a vertically integrated unit. The reason is that ‘contracting 
leads to contract enforcement costs, which may be lower for cooperative firms than for investor owned 
firms (IOFs) because cooperative firms potentially have more ways to punish members who fail to live up 
to their contracts than do IOFs. Not only can a cooperative include the same noncompliance clauses in its 
contracts as does an IOF, but members who act opportunistically toward their cooperative may face social 
sanctions from their fellow farmers as well’ (Staatz, 1987, p. 97).   5 
consumers distributed uniformly over the interval  ] , 1 [ q q -  with unit density, where 1 > q . 
Each consumer either buys high quality, low quality or does not buy at all. The consumer 














All consumers prefer higher quality at a given price, but a consumer with higher q
~
 is willing 
to pay more for higher quality. The parameter  q  measures the degree of consumer 
differentiation in evaluating product quality. The inverse demand functions for high and low 
quality are 
L L H H H H Q s Q s s p - - =q  and  ) (
L H L L Q Q s p - - = q . To simplify notation, we 
normalize  1 =
L s ,  1 ‡ = s s
H . Note, that if all final products are of the same quality ( 1 = s ), 
the inverse demand function is  Q p p p
L H - = = = q .
4 If products differ in quality ( 1 > s ), 
consumers are willing to pay more for the higher quality (
L H p p > ). 
 
3. Closed membership equilibrium 
To describe the farmers’, the cooperative’s and the firm’s behaviour, we first assume nF and 
nC to be exogenously given. Each farmer has already decided whether to deliver to the firm or 
to the cooperative (closed membership). Suppose that the final product of the cooperative is of 
higher quality then the competing firm’s product. In this case, the cooperative receives the 
higher market price  p
H and an individual members’ profit is 
f cq q Q Q q s s C C F i C C
H




] ) ( [q p , where  i C Q - ,  denotes the total output of all 
other members of the cooperative. If, however, the cooperative’s product has lower quality, 




) ( C C F i C C
L
C cq q Q Q q - - - - = - q p . Finally, in the case 
                                                 
4  Note that this case exactly corresponds to Albaek and Schultz.   6 
where there are no quality differences between the cooperative and the firm, profits are 
f cq sq Q Q q C C F i C C
HH








)] ( [ C C F i C C
LL
C cq q Q Q q - + + - = - q p . 
5 
Profit maximisation for the firm gives different results. If the firm supplies the higher quality, 
the equation to maximise is  f n
n
Q
c n Q Q sQ s F
F
F
F F C F
H




] [q . If the firm 











c n Q Q Q - - - = P q . 






















), we compute equilibrium 
profits for the individual members of the cooperative as well as for the farmers supplying the 
firm for all combinations of quality levels. The results are summarized in Table 1 in an 
appendix which is available in an extended version of this paper. 
The choice of quality levels and the corresponding profits of the members of the cooperative 
and of the farmers delivering to the firm depend on parameters s and f as well as on the 
number of firms nC and nF. Figure 1 illustrates the farmers’ choices for a given number of 
firms  nF =  nC =  3  and for  c  =  1  by means of  five  ‘isoprofit’ c ontours.  The following 
paragraphs illustrate the logic of the individuals’ decisions to provide low or high quality as 
well as the key results. A detailed (formal) analysis is provided in the appendix. 
Since f = 0 and s = 1 implies that there in fact are no quality differences (neither in production 
costs nor in the consumers’ willingness to pay), the isoprofit curves all originate in this point. 
As the costs of producing a high quality product relative to a low quality product (f) increases, 
the consumers’ willingness to pay for higher quality (s) also has to increases in order to 
guarantee each farmer the same level of profits (the isoprofit curves slope upwards).  
                                                 
5  The superscript always denotes whether the organization in question (the firm or the cooperative) 
produces high or low quality. Two superscripts denote that both the firm and the cooperative produce 
high (HH) or low (LL) quality, while one superscript indicates that the quality levels are different.   7 
Figure 1. Isoprofit curves of the firm and the cooperative 
 
Suppose the price increase, which can be realized due to higher quality (measured by s), is s = 
s1. If the additional costs of producing high quality (f) are large (f > f1), all members of the 
cooperative as well as the firm will choose to supply low quality (see proposition 1 in the 
appendix). Area A in Figure 1 represents all combinations of f and s where both, the firm and 
the cooperative deliver low quality. The profits for the individual farmers will be 
LL
F p  and 
LL




C p p >  as long as  1 > F n , which corresponds to Albaek and Schultz. If 
there are no quality differences between the firm and the cooperative, the cooperative will be 
more successful in terms of generating higher profits for its members (see proposition 2 in the 
appendix). 
As f decreases below f1 (for a given s = s1) the firm and/or the cooperative will switch to 
higher quality. The following payoff matrix illustrates the decision making process within the 
cooperative given that the firm produces low quality. 
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F s f IP p p = ”    8 
Table 2: Payoff matrix for members of the cooperative if the firm produces low quality 
Member i 
H  L 
H  H
C p   
H
C p  
- LL
C p   
LL
C p  
All other 
members  L  LL
C p   
- LL
C p  
LL
C p   
LL
C p  
 
Note that the cooperative still produces low quality even if farmer i delivers high quality but 
all other members of the cooperative produce low quality. Since farmer  i has higher 
production costs, his profits will be smaller 
- LL
C p  < 
LL
C p . Whether the cooperative ends up 
producing high or low quality depends on the comparison between 
H
C p  and 
LL
C p . If 
H
C p  < 
LL
C p , the dominant strategy for all members is to deliver low quality. If on the other hand 
H
C p  
> 
LL
C p , Table 2 suggests the existence of two Nash equilibria in the decision making within 
the cooperative. To evaluate whether the firm or the cooperative will first switch to higher 
quality as f decreases (for a given s), we compare two isoprofit curves. The isoprofit curve 





F s f IP p p = ”  represents all combinations of f and s for which the firm is indifferent 




F p p = ) given that the cooperative produces low 





C s f IP p p = ”   is the corresponding isoprofit curve for the 
cooperative, given that the firm  has low quality. The fact that 
C F IP IP 1 1 >  suggests, that the 
firm will first switch to high quality as f decreases (see proposition 3 in the appendix). All 
combinations of f and s, where the firm will supply high and the cooperative will deliver low 
quality are represented by area B in Figure 1. 
As f further decreases (below f2), the incentives from supplying high quality for each member 
of the cooperative becomes stronger. Note that the payoff matrix for the individual member of   9 
the cooperative has changed since (for f < f1) the firm  now produces high quality. The new 
payoffs are shown in Table 3.  
Table 3: Payoff matrix for members of the cooperative if the firm produces high quality 
Member i 
H  L 
H  HH
C p   
HH
C p  
- L
C p   
L
C p  
All other 
members  L  L
C p   
- L
C p  
L
C p   
L
C p  
 
Note, that  there are incentives for  free riding within the cooperative. Given that the firm 
produces high quality (since f < f1), all members of the cooperative would also have to deliver 
high quality to guarantee a high quality final product for the cooperative. As soon as one 
member delivers low quality, the final product of the cooperative will be of lower quality than 
the rival (firm’s) product. 
- L
C p  denotes a members’ profit if  she produces high quality 
whereas the other members of the cooperative free ride and deliver low quality only. Free 
riding would save production costs and thus 
- L
C p  < 
L
C p .  
Whether the cooperative will produce high quality depends on the comparison between 
L
C p  
and 
HH









C p p < , the payoff matrix again suggests two Nash-equilibria (see proposition 4 
in the appendix). In one case, all members of the cooperative deliver low quality. Note that 
the decision of the cooperative to produce low quality reinforces the decision of the firm to 
produce high quality (since  f <  f1).  The equilibrium would be characterised by the firm 
producing high and the cooperative low quality. 
In the second case, all members of the cooperative decide to produce high quality. How would 
the firm respond to the decision of the cooperative to supply high quality? To answer this 
question, it is helpful to compute an isoprofit contour for the firm under the assumption that   10 
the cooperative supplies high quality. The firm is indifferent between high and low quality if 




F IP s f f 2 ) ( ) ( ” = = p p . For a given s = s1, the firm will always want to 
produce high quality (even if the cooperative should decide to produce high quality too) if f < 
f3. Area D in Figure 1 is characterised by combinations of s and f such that the firm always 
produces high quality whereas the cooperative will produce high or low quality (proposition 5 
in the appendix).  
In cases where f2 < f < f3, the firm would supply high quality only if the cooperative should 
decide to produce low quality. If the Nash-equilibrium in the decision making process within 
the cooperative has all members delivering high quality products, the firm would prefer to 
switch to a low quality product instead. To understand this (surprising) result, suppose the 
firm also decides to produce high quality. If all members of the cooperative produce high 
quality, the equilibrium will be characterised by a situation where each member of the 
cooperative earns profits of 
HH
C p  whereas farmers delivering to the firm receive 
HH
F p . Note 




C p p >  as 
long as  1 > F n  (which corresponds to Albaek and Schultz). Thus, given that the cooperative 
prefers to produce high quality (for s = s1 and f3 < f < f2), the firm is better off by saving 
production costs and producing lower quality.  The equilibrium  in area C will always be 
characterized with products of different quality, but the model does  not  provide a clear 
prediction of whether the cooperative or the firm will supply the superior or the inferior 
quality (proposition 4 in the appendix shows that 
F C IP IP 2 2 > ). 





F IP s f f 2 ) ( ) ( ” = < p p . Here, the dominant strategy for the firm is to produce 
high quality whereas the decision making process within the cooperative (see Table 3) has all 
members either producing high or low quality (proposition 5 in the appendix).   11 
In the specific situation analysed so far, where  nF =  nC = 3 and the quality of the 
manufacturers’ composite good is determined by the minimum of the quality levels of its 
components (the inputs delivered by the individual farmers), we find that no  general 
predictions as  to  the whether the firm or the cooperative provides higher quality can be 
derived. The free-rider problem in the supply of high-quality products, although important for 
the members of the cooperative, is not strong enough to ensure that firms will always supply 
higher quality than cooperatives.  
The extent of the free riding problem however crucially depends on the way  in which the 
quality of the final (manufacturers’) product is determined from the inputs of the farmers. In 
the case considered so far, the free-rider problem is mitigated since a reduction of the quality 
of inputs delivered by one member immediately leads to a reduction in the quality of the final 
product. Any costs savings associated with lower quality  have to be weighted against the 
losses from a price reduction. In the alternative scenario, where the quality of the final product 
is the (weighted) average of the quality of inputs delivered by farmers, the free-riding problem 
is much larger. In this case, which is described in more detail in the extended version of this 
paper, we find that the quality of the firms’ product will never be below the quality of the 
cooperatives’ product (if nF = nC = 3).  
 
4. Open-membership equilibrium 
The previous section considered the choice of product quality given the number of farms nF 
and nC (nF = nC = 3). In an open-membership equilibrium, the total number of farmers n is 
exogenously given but the share of farmers delivering to the cooperative and to the firm is 
endogenous.  As long as both manufacturers choose to deliver the same level of product 
quality, analyzing an open-membership equilibrium does not provide new insights. In this 
case, farmers delivering to the cooperative will receive larger profits as long as  1 > F n . In the 
long run, all farmers will become members of the cooperative, which corresponds to Albaek   12 
and Schultz (1998). The open-membership equilibrium however will be different when the 
firm and the cooperative offer products of different quality, which is shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 2. Open-membership equilibrium for different quality levels 
  Figure 2a  Figure 2b 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the level of profits per farmer delivering to the firm ( pF) and the 
cooperative (pC) in the case where the cooperative produces higher quality (Figure 2a) as well 
as where the firm’s products are of superior quality (Figure 2b). The profit of each farmer 
depends on the market share of the cooperative and the firm (defined as the share of farmers 
delivering to the cooperative and to the firm). As long as pC > pF, farmers would join the 
cooperative. An additional farmer delivering to the cooperative increases the output of the 
cooperative and thus reduces the price of its product. Whether this increases or decreases 
aggregate profits in the cooperative is unclear (and depends on the parameters of the model). 
As the aggregate profit of the cooperative now has to be shared among more members, the 
profits per farmer (pC) decline. On the other hand, profits per farmer delivering to the firm 
will increase since nF declines. This process stops as soon as there are no incentives to join the 
cooperative, that is when pC = pF.  
The number of farmers delivering to the firm and the cooperative in an open-membership 
equilibrium are determined by the parameters c, s, f and n. The effects of a change of these 
parameters on the profits and on the market shares of the firm and the cooperative are 
summarized in the appendix.  
L
C p  
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F n   C n   n 
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C p p =  
F n   C n   n 
p    13 
The following Figure 3 illustrates some comparative static results. If, for a given f = f0, the 
consumers willingness to pay for higher quality (s) is small (s < s0), the cooperative and the 
firm will choose to supply low quality. In this case, the profits of cooperative members will 
exceed those of farmers delivering to the firm as long as nF > 1 and the market share of firms 
(nF/(nF + nC)) will thus be small. As high quality becomes more important for consumers and 
s increases above s0, the firm will start producing high quality whereas the cooperative prefers 
to produce low quality (see Figure 1). As the relative profitability of farmers delivering to the 
high quality producer (the firm) increases with s (see Table 5 in the appendix), more and more 
farmers will leave the cooperative. The market share of the firm increases.  
Figure 3. Market shares of the firm and the cooperative 
 
As s increases above s1, there are two Nash-equilibria (see again Figure 1). If the firm is the 
high-quality producer and the cooperative supplies low quality, then the share of farmers 
delivering to the firm further increases with  s. However, if the product of the cooperative 
turns out to be of higher quality, then the market share of the firm decreases with s (see Table 
5 in the appendix).  
In the interval s > s2, the firm will always produce high quality whereas the cooperative will 
supply high or low quality. In this interval, the market share of the firm will further increase 
s 
nF/(nF+nC) 
s0  s1  s2 
1/(1+nC) 
1   14 
(with an increase in s) if the firm is the only producer of high quality products. If, however 
both manufacturers (the firm and the cooperative) deliver high quality products, the market 
share of the firm drops dramatically (to 1/(1 + nC)) since the product quality of the two 
manufacturers is identical again.  
This theoretical analysis of an open-membership mixed-duopoly offers some implications that 
could in principal be tested empirically. (a) The incentives for an investor-owned firm to 
supply higher-quality products are larger compared to the incentives for  cooperative 
members. Members of a cooperative face a free-rider problem with respect to the supply of 
quality. (b) The free-rider problem in the supply of high-quality products however may not be 
strong enough to ensure that firms will always supply higher quality than cooperatives. (c) 
The market share of the cooperative will not necessarily be as high as suggested in Albaek 
and Schultz (1998). (d) The market share of the cooperative will be high in markets, where 
quality differences between products are not considered important by consumers (no vertical 
product differentiation). (e) The market share of firms on the other hand can be particularly 
high in market where consumers consider quality to be important. (f) The model predicts the 
existence of multiple-equilibria in markets where quality matters. This suggests that for the 
same product, differences in market shares of cooperatives might well exist between countries 
(or different time periods).
6  
 
                                                 
6   We do not attempt to provide a detailed empirical analysis here but rather refer to some evidence 
collected in different studies. Hendrikse (1998) provides some data on market shares of cooperatives for 
different products in Europe (see Table 6 in Appendix C). While cooperatives have large market shares in 
some countries and some markets (e.g. milk production in Ireland) they are virtually non-existent in other 
markets (e.g. beef production in Belgium or Greece). Within a particular country (e.g. Denmark), the 
market shares of cooperatives vary between 0 % (poultry and sugar beet) and 97 % (pork), and within a 
specific market (e.g. vegetables), market shares differ between 8 % (Ireland) and 90 % (Denmark). For 
the U.S.A., Cook (1995) observes that the market share of cooperatives in the market for milk production 
in the US increased steadily from 46 % in 1951 to 85 % in 1993 (see Table 7 in Appendix C). The market 
shares in other markets remained fairly stable (e.g. fruits and vegetables) or even declined slightly (e.g. 
livestock).   15 
4. Conclusions and Extensions 
The speed of structural change has not been the same in different parts of the agrifood sector. 
Whereas processing and distribution of agricultural products now is highly concentrated in 
most developed countries, farming still is characterized by a large number of  small family 
owned businesses. ‘This combination of dispersed family ownership and highly concentrated 
processing and distribution sectors poses unique challenges, particularly with respect to 
vertical coordination and quality control over the supply chain’ (Menard and Klein, 2004, p. 
751).  
The present paper investigates the  issue of product quality in a vertically related industry. 
Quality choices of an investor owned firm and a producer cooperative are analyzed within a 
mixed duopoly framework. Assuming that the members of the cooperative are paid according 
to the quantity they deliver and that the quality of the  inputs is  non-contractible between 
independent actors, there is a strong incentive to free-ride and deliver low quality. This free 
rider problem among members of cooperatives is a well-recognized problem in the literature 
(see, among others, Cook 1995 and Fulton 1995). The investor owned firm on the other hand 
is assumed to be  vertically integrated and thus is not plagued by a quality coordination 
problem.  
The free rider problem within the cooperative with respect to product quality suggests that the 
investor owned firm will sell products of higher quality. In contrast to Albaek and Schultz 
(1998) the investor owned firm will be able to gain a large market share. However, we find 
that free-riding among members of the cooperative may not be strong enough to ensure that 
firms will always supply higher quality than cooperatives. In markets, where delivering high 
quality is highly rewarded by consumers (s is large) and/or the costs of producing high quality 
are low (f is small) the cooperative will produce the higher quality product. Despite the fact 
that the investor owned firm is vertically integrated (and thus does not face a coordination 
problem with respect to product quality) the quality of its product can be lower.   16 
To what extent the degree of competition influences the quality decisions in a mixed duopoly 
has not yet been investigated in detail. The previous discussion assumed Cournot-behaviour 
between the cooperative and the investor-owned firm. If competition is  more aggressive 
however, the comparative advantage of the cooperative in a homogenous product market 
disappears.  The question whether  this influences the incentives of the firm  and/or the 
cooperative to supply high quality products is left for future research.  
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